Voting System

veARITECT-based voting mechanics, commit-reveal process, and success criteria for governance proposals.

veARITECT voting system

Voting power in Aritect governance is determined by veARITECT balance — a non-transferable governance token earned through ecosystem participation.

Voting mechanics:

  • Voting power: Equal to veARITECT balance.
  • Vote reward: +100 veARITECT for each vote cast.
  • Voting period: 14 days for all proposals (7 days commit phase + 7 days reveal phase).
  • Minimum participation: 15,000 total veARITECT must participate in voting.
  • Vote options: Support, Oppose, Abstain.

Voting power formula:

Voting Power = veARITECT

veARITECT accumulation

veARITECT is earned through active participation in the Aritect ecosystem:

Earning veARITECT:

  • Ecosystem participation: Periodic distribution based on platform usage and engagement.
  • Voting: +100 veARITECT per vote cast.
  • Successful proposals: +200 to +500 veARITECT depending on bond amount (see Proposal Submission).

Losing veARITECT:

  • Rejected proposals: Bond burned (100-500 veARITECT depending on bond amount).
  • Monthly loss cap: Maximum 20% of veARITECT balance can be lost per month.
  • Inactivity decay: -5% per month if no governance actions taken.

Why veARITECT matters:

  • Sybil resistance: veARITECT requires genuine ecosystem participation, making fake accounts expensive to maintain.
  • DeFi attack immunity: veARITECT is completely independent from $ARITECT — borrowing $ARITECT provides zero governance power.
  • Vote buying protection: veARITECT is non-transferable and cannot be sold, delegated, or wrapped.
  • Active governance: Decay mechanism ensures governance is controlled by active participants, not passive holders.

Commit-reveal process

  • Commit phase (Days 1-7): Participants submit encrypted vote commits without revealing their choice.
  • Reveal phase (Days 8-14): Participants reveal their actual votes by providing the decryption key.
  • Anti-coordination: This prevents last-minute vote coordination and manipulation.
┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    COMMIT-REVEAL TIMELINE                     │
├───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                               │
│  Day 0                     Day 7                Day 14        │
│   │                         │                     │           │
│   ▼                         ▼                     ▼           │
│   ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────┐       │
│   │     COMMIT PHASE        │       REVEAL PHASE      │       │
│   │      (7 days)           │        (7 days)         │       │
│   ├─────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────┤       │
│   │  vote = H(choice⊕salt)  │  reveal(choice, salt)   │       │
│   │  Votes hidden           │  Votes counted          │       │
│   └─────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────┘       │
│                                                               │
│   H = cryptographic hash function.                            │
│   ⊕ = concatenation operator.                                 │
│                                                               │
└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Success criteria

  • Qualified majority: 60% of participating votes must be “Support”.
  • Minimum engagement: At least 15,000 veARITECT must participate in voting.
  • No quorum requirement: Proposals can pass with any participation level above minimum.

Success formula:

Proposal passes ⇔ (σ ≥ θ) ∧ (ΣV ≥ Vmin)

Where:
  σ    = support ratio = Vsupport / (Vsupport + Voppose)
  θ    = threshold = 0.60 (60%)
  ΣV   = total veARITECT participating
  Vmin = minimum participation = 15,000 veARITECT

Note: Abstain votes count toward ΣV but not toward σ